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~(.01(.S . ·Tke 1. The United States seeks review of the decision 
~tt-Qu..,L ·/.s Afe of CA 5 affirming the DC (W.D. Texas) (Spears) decision that 
di vu:-lec{ , 
-~~ 
testimony given by resp before a grand jury had to be sup-
pressed in subsequent prosecutions for making false declaratio~s .---------- . 
before a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and attempting to ---
1/ 
- MR. JUSTICE POWELL extended the time for filing until December 
15, 1974, a Sunday. The petition was filed on the next day. 
- 2 -
II 
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 846. The CA and DC 
decisions were based upon the holding that resp was a 
"putative defendant" entitled to Miranda warnings prior to 
being questioned before the grand jury, that the warning 
given was inadequate, and that the conduct of the prosecution 
was unfair. It therefore found that the questioning before -the grand jury had violated the resp's due process rights and 
thus that the testimony given had to be suppressed. The SG 
takes issue with each of these holdings. 
2. FACTS: A federal narcotics officer had reported 
that he had offered resp $650 for the purchase of heroin, that 
resp took the money but was unable to obtain any h~roin, and 
that consequently resp returned the money to the officer. Resp 
,- was subsequently called before a grand jury. The government 
attorney conducting the questioning before the grand jury 
testified later that he had talked to the agent involved before 
resp was questioned at the grand jury session. Resp appeared 
pursuant to subpoena and was given the following warning: 
2/ 
"Q: Now you are required to answer 
all the questions that I ask you except 
for the ones that you feel would tend 
to incriminate you. Do you understand 
that? 
"A: Do I answer all the questions 
you ask? 
- The government proceeded to trial in its case against resp 
under§ 846, and resp was convicted. That conviction was 
affirmed by CA 5, and resp's petition here in No. 74-5441 was 
denied on January 13, 1975. 
I, 
- 3 -
"Q: You have 
questions except 
will incriminate 
s ion of a crime. 
"A: Yes, sir. 
to answer all the 
for those you think 
you in the commis-
Is that clear? 
"Q: You don't have to answer 
questions which would incriminate you. 
All other questions you have to answer 
openly and truthfully. And, of course, 
if you do not answer those truthfully, 
in other words, if you lie about 
certain questions, you could possibly 
be charged with perjury." 
Resp was then questioned about whether anyone had attempted 
to buy heroin from him or whether he had tried to sell any 
heroin to anybody. Resp answered that no one had tried to 
buy heroin from him and that he had not tried to sell any. 
The government attorney used the figure $650 at one point in 
. the questioning. 
The DC, after the suppression hearing, concluded that 
resp was a "virtual" or "putative" defendant at the time of the 
questioning. It rejected the government's argument based upon 
the representation that no prosecution of resp was contemplated 
prior to the grand jury testimony, and that the file in the · case 
was closed: 
"The transcript of the grand jury 
proceedings reveals deliberate and 
careful attention to questions which 
specifically delved into the facts 
concerning these contacts between the 
defendant(s) and government agents. 
The special attorney was aware that 
no case had been made, and though this 
Court does not presume any improper 
motives on the part of the government 
agents or the special attorney, it 
- 4 -
strains credulity to suggest that 
the special attorney did not have one 
eye on a possible prosecution of 11 
the defendants." (Footnote omitted.) 
The DC held that resp had not completely, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his right to remain silent. He had not 
properly been told of that right, nor of his right to have 
appointed counsel outside the grand jury room. Miranda 
warnings are required whenever a putative defendant was called 
to testify, that is, one as to whom the prosecution had plans 
to indict, it was gathering evidence against, and it had focused 
specifically upon as a potential defendant. That test -had been 
met here. 
The CA affirmed. It accepted that DC's findings that 
at the time of the testimony the government had knowledge of 
resp's involvement in criminal activity, that resp was a person 
whom the government had plans to indict, that the prosecution 
had been gathering evidence against resp, and that at the time 
that the questions were asked the government knew that affirmative 
answers would amount to a confession. The prosecution put .resp 
in a position of confessing or committing perjury, since it had 
not adequately informed him of his right to remain silent. 
3/ 
- Resp's motion to suppress was considered with that of one 
Rangel. Rangel's motion to suppress was also granted and 
affirmed. The SG has not pursued cert there because, he says, 
the warning given Rangel was confusing and ambiguous and con-
tained an implicit threat that he would be held in contempt if 
he wrongly declined to testify. 
- 5 -
Moreover , i f the government's questions were intended to 
acquire information about sources of heroin, it could have 
asked questions about heroin dealers without asking whether 
resp had been involved in any sales. As a putative defendant, 
resp was entitled to Miranda warnings. Suppression was re-
quired despite the charge of perjury because the action of the 
prosecution had been unfair. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
a. The SG argues that no Miranda warnings should 
be required in this situation, since resp was not being compelled 
to incriminate himself. The fact that a witness is suspected 
of criminal involvement does not make his answers to questions 
before the grand jury involuntary. Resp could have invoked his 
,- Fifth Amendment privilege. The oppressiveness of custodial 
interrogation is not present in the grand jury room. Because of 
knowledge of resp's prior activity, the government was entitled 
to call him as a witness; he clearly could have knowledge of 
sources of heroin. There was nothing unfair in this questioning. 
b. Assuming that some warning must be given a 
"putative" defendant, the warning given here was sufficient. 
Witnesses are not entitled to a right to remain silent. They may 
claim the privilege against self-incrimination, but even then they 
may be compelled to testify if they are given sufficient immunity 
for their answers. The right to appointed counsel recognized 
by the CA conflicts with this Court's ruling that the right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment begins with "[t]he initiation 
- 6 -
of j udicia l criminal proceedings." Kirby v. Illinois, 
406 U.S . 682, 689 (1972). Since the questioning here is 
very different from the custodial interrogation involved 
-
in Miranda, there is not the same need for having appointment 
of counsel here. 
c. The SG contends that resp was not a putative 
defendant at the time of the grand jury questioning. The 
proper test for determining whether a witness is a putative 
defenJ ant is a combination of objective and subjective features: 
"there must be sufficient evidence to support an indictment at 
the time the witness is called, and it must also be established 
that the witness was in fact a target of the grand jury's tn-
vestigations whom the prosecutor expected to be indicted." 
d. The CA created an exception to the long-standing 
rule that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be 
used as a license for perjury. Glickstein v. United States, 222 
' 
U.S. 139, 142 (1911). There is a conflict among the circuits on 
the treatment of testimony given before the grand jury when the 
government charges that it constitutes perjury and the defendant 
was not given full warnings. CA 5 here and CA 9 in United States 
v. Wong, cert. pending, No. 74-635, have suppressed the testimony. 
CA 2, CA 7, and CA 10 have taken the contrary position. See 
citations in petn, at 18 n. 10. There is no good reason for 
suppression here. The procedure was not unfair; the government 
had good and legitimate reasons for calling resp before the 
grand jury. It is an unlikely deterrent, since few prosecutors 
I ' ~ 
- 7 -
"woul d risk losing the use of confessions or other 
i ncriminating evidence for the sake of obtaining evidence 
of perjur y . " 
4 . DISCUSSION: The issues of whether warnings 
mus t be given to putative defendants called before the grand 
jury and, if insufficient warnings are given, whether the 
testimony given should be suppressed in a later perjury trial 
aris i ng from the grand jury testimony are also presented in 
United States v. Wong, supra, No. 74-635, in which there has 
been a call for a response. This case may well be the better 
one for consideration of these issues, since the warning issue 
in Wong is complicated by the question whether the witness 
linguistically understood the warning given. It would appear 
,· that a response should be requested in this case also and that 
Wong and this case should hereafter be considered together. 
1/28/75 
ME 
There is no response. 
Malysiak DC and CA Opinions 
in Petn. Appx. 
~c.A-.~C.~ 
Court Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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UNITED STA TES 
v. 
MANDUJANO 
Motion of Respondent 
for Appointment of Counsel 
JJ1scuss 
On March 24, the Court granted cert t 
review its affirmance of a USDC trial order s 
Coleman, Ainsworth)" to 
res sing resp1 s grand jury testiJ.nony 
on grounds that the Government had failed to give him Miranda warnings to which he 
was entitled as a 11putative 11 or 11virtual 11 defendant. 
Counsel for resp, Michael Alle~ sq. of Houston, Texasi requests -
that he be appointed to represent resp in this Courto Counsel avers that: (1) he was 
appoi:qted under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 to represent resp in CA 5; (2) that he 
is fully familiar with the issues presented in this case; and (3) that he is a member of 
the Texas bar. Mr. Peters is not a member of the bar of this Court. --4/4/75 ----- Goltz 
PJN 
.,, Conference 4-18-75 
Court 
CA - 5 
Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 74-754 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
12/16/74 Cert. filed. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, J ...... . .......... . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J . ................ . 
Marshall, J . ................. . 
, 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J .................... . 
Burger, Ch. J . ............... . 
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Supreme Court of the United State8 
M emor1,"'.,dum 
April 23 75 ----------------------------- --------, 1 g _____ __ _ 
Justice Powell: 
Judge Spears called. He gave 
me a message - if you need to know 
anything further, feel free to call 
him. The Judge received the 
following information about 
Michael Peters from Ben Connolly 
in Houston, and from the Clerk of 
the Court of Appeals. Mr. Peters 
graduated from law school (U. of 
Houston L.S.) about a year ago, 
was admitted to practice in 
Houston in June, 1974. His 
address is 1217 Calhoun Street, 
Houston, Texas 77002. 
Judge Connolly tried to 
get in touch with other Judges but 
this seems to be about the extent 
of the information about Mr. 
Peters. They seem to feel that 
he is a young, new lawyer, who 
r- ..___, 
Supreme Court of the United State8 
Mem01 - ndum 
-------- -----------------------------, 1 g __ ___ __ _ 
2. 
submitted his name to be Court 
appointed. None of the Judges 
seem to know what type of work 
he does. 
The Judge (Judge Spears) 
said to tell you not to worry 
about how you pronounce Spanish 
names - from a South Carolinian 
to a Virginian - he has an awful 
time pronouncing the Spanish names 
he has to deal with. 
g 
April 24, 1975 
No. 74-754 United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Mike: 
As you know, the Conference authorized me to appoint 
counsel in the above case. 
Although I have been able to obtain relatively little 
information on Michael Allen Peters, he wom the case in the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where he had been 
appointed to represent the indigent defendant. 
Accordingly, I have decided to appoint him to continue 
this representation before us. 
In this connection, I note that he is not licensed to 
practice before this Court, but I believe we make exceptions 
in cases like this. 
Sincerely, 




No. 74-754 United States v. Mandujano 
The purpose of this memo, dictated during the sunnner, 
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record 
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the 
opinions below. 
This case presents, broadly, questions as to whether 
Miranda warnings must be given a "putative defendant" called 
as a witness before a grand jury, and whether - if warnings 
are required - a failure to give them should result in the 
suppression of the witness' testimony in a subsequent 
prosecution for perjury. CA5 (Tuttle) answered these questions 
against the government. 
Respondent was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury 
investigating narcotics traffic. At the time, t he prosecutor 
knew from a government informer that respondent has received 
$650 from the informer and attempted to purchase heroin. 
Prior to respondent's testimony,he was advised by the prosecutor 
as follows: 
Q. ***Now you are required to answer all 
the question that I ask you except for the ones that 
you feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you 
understand that? 
A. Do I answer all the questions you ask? 
Q. You have to answer all the questions except 
for those you think will incriminate you in the 
connnission of a crime. Is that clear? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You don't have to answer questions which 
would incriminate you. All other questions you have 
to answer openly and truthfully. And, of course, if 
you do not answer those truthfully, in other words, 
2. 
if you lie about certain questions, you could pos-
sibly be charged with perjury. Do you understand that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
The prosecutor then asked respondent if he had talked to 
anyone about selling heroin, had promised to obtain and sell 
heroin to anyone, or had accepted $650 to buy heroin for anyone. 
Respondent flatly denied involvement in any such events or 
activities. 
Respondent was subsequently indicted for attempting to 
distribute heroin, and on a second count for perjury. On 
respondent's motion to suppress his testimony on the ground 
that he had not received full Miranda warnings, the DC"found" 
as a fact that respondent was a putative or virtual defendant 
when called before the grand jury and therefore was entitled 
to the warnings. CAS affirmed, relying on the DC's finding 
that defendant was a "virtual" or putative defendant. 
CAS held that the warnings given by the prosecutor did ~ 
not meet the full Miranda requirements; that the prosecutor's 
conduct was therefore unfair and violative of due process, 
and that the DC was correct in suppressing respondent's 
perjured testimony. 
Position of the Government 
The SG's brief states the government's position as 
follows: 
"The decision of the court of appeals turns 
upon three conclusions, each of which must be 
correct in order to support suppression of 
respondent's allegedlz perjurious grand jury 
testimony: (1) that putative defendants' should 
be given full Miranda warnings before testifying 
to a grand jury; (2) that respondent was a putative 
defendant; and (3) that his testimony was properly 
suppressed for use in a prosecution based upon its 
alleged falsity. We contend that the court erred 
in its disposition of each of these three issues." 
The first and third "conclusions"of CAS present the 
critical issues in this case. 
Miranda warnings 
3. 
The SG argues, with considerable force, that the 
characteristics of grand jury questioning are not comparable 
to the type of incommunicado police interrogation described 
by the police in Miranda. A grand jury interrogation takes 
place before 23 private citizens, the proceedings are usually 
recorded (as they were in this case); there is no opportunity 
for the use of physical force or threats; and a judge is 
standing by to intercede if necessary. Although respondent 
did not have a lawyer outside of the grand jury room, he had 
been advised by the prosecutor that he was entitled to have 
such a lawyer for consultation. (See SG's brief p. 5). 
4. 
Respondent had stated, however, that he did not have 
money to engage a lawyer and he was not advised of entitlement 
to a free lawyer. 
Moreover, the SG notes that the Miranda warnings would 
not apply in two important respects to a grand jury witness: 
(1) a grand jury witness has no absolute right to remain silent, 
except to the extent that he invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege; 
and (2) the Constitution does not confer upon an unindicted 
grand jury witness a right to appointed counsel. See In re 
Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332-333; and Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682. 
Reliance is placed particularly on the language of the 
Fifth Amendment: 
"No person ... shall be comhelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against imself .... " 
In view of the fact that the government attorney expressly 
warned respondent that "you don't have to answer questions 
which would incriminate you", the SG argues that there was 
no compulsion. Putting it differently, although a grand jury 
witness is under compulsion to testify when subpoenaed, this 
does not extend to self incrimination. Although an ignorant 
witness, without benefit of counse~ might - even at a time in 
history when "taking the Fifth" is a household phrase - not 
be aware of the privilege, this respondent had been expressly 
advised of this right. 
s. 
The SG disputes the DC's finding, accepted by CAS, that 
respondent was a "putative defendant", but goes on to argue 
that this is really immaterial. In view of the differences 
between grand jury and police interrogation, Miranda~type 
warnings are not required regardless of whether the witness 
is a likely prospect for prosecution. 
Reliance is placed on United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 
424, 427 to the effect that a grand jury witness "must claim 
•.. [the privilege] or he will not be considered to have 
been compelled within the meaning of the Amendment." 
Suppression in a Perjury Prosecution? 
The second major issue in this case is whether, assuming 
failure to give the appropriate warnings, respondent's 
testimony conceded to be false for purposes of this case -
must be suppressed in this prosecution for perjury? 
The SG argues that this holding of CAS is warranted 
neither by policy nor precedent. It is clear to me that it 
is unjustified as a matter of policy. A vast new opportunity . 
for litigation and escap~ uccessful prosecution would be 
opened up if the ~!holding is affirmed by this Court. 
Grand jury witnesses would insist, when prosecuted, that they 
had been inadequately warned, and particularly that · they had 
been denied the benefit of counsel. Indeed, inherent in the 
warning 
Miranda/requirement is the right of indigents to the advice 
of counsel at the expense of the state. Extending this right 
6. 
to every witness before a grand jury who might conceivably 
be prosecuted at a later date, would represent a significant 
departure from custom and precedent in the administration of 
criminal justice. 
The SG cites, but with a minimum of analysis, several 
decisions of this Court as supportive of the position that 
the Fifth Amendment does not endow the person who testifies 
[not having invoked the Fifth] with a license to commit 
perjury." Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142. 
I must read these cases. 
Position of Respondent 
Judge Tuttle's opinion in this case is quite persuasive 
on its face. As would be expected, respondent relies heavily 
--r-~, ~ . d h. b . f dd h. . Th . on ~ s opinion an is rie a snot i ng to it. ere is .,. 
emphasis on the argument that respondent in effect was 
"entrapped", that the prosecutor knew perfectly well that 
~ 
respondent was a target for prosecution, that the interrogation 
A 
was violative of "fundamental fairness". 
Viewed in one sense, this is a rather appealing argument -
especially where the witness (as in the case of respondent) 




As is evident from the above, I lean rather strongly 
toward the government's position in this case. Whatever may 
be said negatively about a grand jury proceedings, it is not 
fairly comparable to the inherently coerceive nature of the 
police interrogation which prompted the Miranda rule. 
I am inclined to think that the historical, as well as 
the practical, differences between grand jury and police 
interrogation suffice to support the government's position 
that the Miranda doctrine should not be extended to all grand 
jury questioning. 
I have not thought this through, but if CAS is right in 
its reasoning would not most of its logic apply also to 
witnesses before congressional and other bodies possessing 
investigatory and subpoena powers? To be sure, CAS's opinion 
can be distinguished on the ground that respondent was a 
"putative defendant" whereas witnesses before legislative 
bodies are not. I am not entirely persuaded, however, that 
this makes any difference. Whether the government intends 
to prosecute a witness is not a fact easily ascertainable. 
Indeed, frequently it is not a "fact" at all. If this were 
the test, courts would be compelled to inquire into the 
subjective intent of prosecutors - an inquiry unlikely to 
respond to reliable factfinding. Moreover, it is not clear 
to me that a witness who may be a suspect is entitled to more 
8. 
warning than a witness, guilty of crime, of which the govern-
ment either had no knowledge or merely vague suspicions. I 
would think the consequences of connnitting perjury should be 
the same in both situations. 
In all of this, I continue to remind myself that the 
public interest is to arrive at the truth with respect to 
criminal activities and, particularly, in the prosecution of 
a particular defendant. The Fifth Amendment has been extended 
far beyond its meaning as originally understood. I am not 
presently inclined to extend its reach further to protect 
perjurers, especially those who have been expressly warned 
of their right not to incriminate themselves. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Phil Jordan 
DATE: October 23, 1975 
No. 74-754 United States v. Mandujano 
I recommend that CA5 be reversed. 
As your aid-to-memory memorandum states, there are really 
two main issues. First, whether a "putative defendant" must 
be given Miranda warnings before being questioned by a grand 
jury. Second, assuming a positive answer to the first question, 
whether failure to give such warnings requires subsequent 
suppression of his grand jury testimony even in a perjury 
prosecution founded upon that very testimony. 
I. Suppression in a Perjury Prosecution 
The narrowest ground for reversal is that failure to 
give Miranda warnings to a putative defendant (a ssuming arguendo 
that such warnings are required and that Mandujano was in fact 
a putative defendant) does not require suppression of subsequent 
testimony in a perjury prosecution based on that testimony. 
The government makes two distinct arguments in favor of this 
result. One argument, that suppression is needlessly drastic 
in this situation, is based on a premise that prosecutors, 
unlike the police involved in custodial interrogations of 
suspects, 
warnings. 
can be relied upon to do their duty and 




be an effective remedy when violations did occur, and would 
interfere with few prosecutions if prosecutors in fact usually 
did give the warnings. 
The government's second argument is that the privilege 
against compelled self-incrimination permits a person to clam 
up but does not give him a license to lie. Neither CA5 nor 
Respondent really meets this argument head-on; instead, they 
pursue a due process analysis and argue that it is simply 
someone before a grand jury 
"unfair" to bring/and question him about a crime the government 
"knows" he corrnnitted. The alleged unfairness lies in the 
resulting "Robson's choice" between admitting guilt or com-
mitting perjury. 
Before dealing with the government's argument about the 
self-incrimination privilege, I want to urge especially that 
you reject CAS's "due process" argument. The argument is 
one version of an often-made attack on the use of the grand 
jury to "trap" people into corrnnitting perjury. For another 
variation, see the amicus brief of Richard Kelly at 3-6, com-
plaining of the practice of calling suspects and grilling 
them mercilessly until they "slip up" and perjure themselves. 
All of these complaints about misue of the grand jury system 
are valid, but the abuses are not subject to correction by 
constitutional adjudication. The only way to reach them 
under the Constitution is through the due process clause, 
as CAS tried to do. But such due process attacks always wind 
up sounding as strained as did CAS's, for all one can do is 
3. 
cite cases like Rochin (the stomach-pumping case) and then 
rant and rail against the unfairness evidenced by the "totality 
of the circumstances." I strongly believe that we are just 
going to have to recognize that the grand jury system can be 
abused, and that for correction of such abuses we must look 
to the good faith of prosecutors and to the judges who over-
see the proceedings. 
Beyond my bias against use of the due process clause 
there is another problem with CAS's opinion. CAS ran right 
by the fact that a person in Ma:ndujano's shoes has a third 
choice in addition to incriminating himself or committing 
perjury: he can refuse to answer if answering would incriminate 
him. Thus, as long as the witness knows of his privilege -
against self-incrimination, it is unnecessary to resort to 
CAS's due process argument to protect him from being "trapped" 
vi,, 
into perjury. This holds true regardlessAhow bad the 
prosecution's motive in hauling the witness before the grand 
jury, for the witness can always thwart the prosecutor simply 
by invoki ng the Fifth. 
CAS and Respondent do doubt would counter my point in 
the last paragraph by arguing that a person confronted with 
a grand jury and a hostile prosecutor fee).s himself "compelled" 
to answer, so that in effect he does not have the "choice" of 
remaining silent. I just don't buy that argument. To accept 
it would undercut every perjury indictment stemming from a 
grand jury. Every indictee could argue that he would have 
4. 
invoked the Fifth except for the compulsion to answer. I do 
not see how a grand jury setting could be considered more 
"coercive" for a putative defendant than for an ordinary 
witness, so I see no way to allow the putative defendant to 
plead CAS's "Robson's choice" but . deny the same plea to other 
witnesses. 
With CAS's due process argument to one side, the remaining 
question is the validity of the government's own argument that 
failure to give Miranda warnings should not affect a subsequent 
perjury prosecution. As noted earlier, the government's basic 
contention is that the privilege against self-incrimination doe..s~ot 
permit one to lie. I will grant that contention,* but it 
I *United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969), appears to support the government's position. In Knox, a defendant prosecuted 
for false statements on wagering tax forms argued that he 
could not be convicted because he had the right, under the 
Fifth Amendment holdings in Marchetti v. United States, 390 
U.S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), 
not to fill out the forms at all. The Court held that he 
could not assert the Marchetti-Grosso privilege as a defense 
in his prosecution. Although Justice Harlan's opinion seems 
• __ OJJ- uncharacteristically opaque, I believe it stands for the 
~ ~ II proposition that the Fifth Amendment gives one no rivile e 
~ ,,,,o to res ond wit fa instea o not respon ing a a 1. 
D .AA>-- See U.S. at 82. 
~' -- The other two cases heavily relied upon by the govern-
ment do not seem to support its position as well. In Brtson 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969), the Court stated tat 
a union official could be prosecuted for falsely denying 
corrnnunist affiliation on a form required by the NLRB, even if 
the demand for the information as to corrnnunist affiliation were 
improper. The case seems weaker authority than Knox because 
the Court's statement was not a clear holding (tneway I read 
the case). But the Court did make this statement: 
Our legal system provides methods for challenging 
the Government's right to ask questions - lying is 
not one of them. A citizen may decline to answer the 
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with 
impunity knowingly and willfully answer with a 
falsehood. 
5. 
does not settle the suppression issue. The argument for 
suppression even in a perjury prosecution actually is based 
not on the Fifth Amendment privilege itself, but on the need 
to enforce the requirement of Miranda warnings. Just as the 
Miranda warnings are considered so important in custodial 
interrogations that failure to give them results in suppression 
of all subsequent statements, it would be a reasonable 2osition 
tt,g_, ~ to suppress everything a putative defendant says unless the 
(}/} t/)) ~~rnings had been given. It boils down to a policy decision: 
,• -~hould the sanction for failure to give the warnings be as 
~ ~ tough as possible, or should the sanction stop short of the 
6;;'~ u1ti~te. If the former, suppress even the perjurious state-
the latter, allow prosecutions for subsequent perjury. 
- _, I would allow prosecutions for perjury. The policy of 
1.J.J'~ -~ denying the prosecutor the use of the testimony seems out-
$-1"¥ weighed by three factors. First, if the testimony cannot be 
.,,. l,~ 
rt-
~ ,vl used there is no way~ to bring the witness to trial for 
the crime of perjury, since the perjurious statements them-
selves form the basis of prosecution. This differs from the 
case where either grand jury testimony of some previous crime 
or a stationhouse confession is suppressed, for in those 
396 U.S. at 72. The final case, Glickstein v. United States, 
222 U.S. 139 (1911), stands for no more than the obvious 
proposition that a person who has been granted immunity in 
return for his statements has not been granted immunity from 
perj,ury prosecutions for any subsequent falsehoods. That 
proposition has been reaffirmed often. 
6. 
instances diligent detective work could turn up other evidence 
on which to prosecute. Second, perjury usually leads the grand 
jury astray in its inquiry. Allowing the grand jury to be 
sidetracked would be a high price to pay in order to effectuate 
Miranda. And third, it would just stick in the craw to let 
a fellow off who lied under oath, even if the prosecutor did 
err in failing to give the warnings. It is of overriding 
importance, I think, to uphold the sanctity of the oath. 
II. Miranda Warnings 
If you wish to eschew the narrow ground of decision set 
out above, you can tackle the issue of whether Miranda warnings 
are required at all. I am of the firm opinion that they are 
not. -- It is important to keep separate two distinct arguments 
for requiring Miranda warnings in the case of the "putative 
defendant." The first argument amounts only to a technical 
extension of Miranda, but the second finds its genesis in the 
basic distaste for the grand jury system that I alluded to 
above. 
The first argument, that the putative defendant before 
the grand jury is somehow "like" the suspect in police custody, 
just does not persuade me. It must be emphasized that the 
Miranda warnings are prophylactics, granting to the suspect 
rights beyond those required by the Constitution itself, for 
the purpose of insuring that he will be free to exercise the 
7. 
constitutional rights that he does have. For instance, there 
is no constitutional right to remain completely silent when 
questioned by police, but Miranda grants that right in order 
to make easier the assertion of the constitutional right not 
to incriminate oneself. Nor is there, probably, a constitutional 
right to have an attorney at initial stationhouse questioning, 
but Miranda grants that right also in order to protect the 
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Prophylactics 
were deemed necessary in Miranda because of the inherent 
coercive effect of stationhouse interrogationsu~o• street 
criminals, who usually are ill-educated and intimidated by 
the police; and because of the opportunity in the stationhouse 
setting for undiscoverable actual coercion. 
The only way to justify transferring the Miranda require-
ments to the grand jury room is to equate that room to the 
stationhouse in its potential for inherent coerciveness and 
undiscoverable actual coercion. The equation just should 
not be made. Whatever inherent coerciveness does exist in 
the grand jury setting has been built into the system 
intentionally, in the belief that society must be able to 
find out the truth about crime in the solemn amnosphere of 
a structured investigation by ordinary citizens. It would 
repudiate the historical judgment in favor of grand juries 
to say now that the elements of coercion purposely designed 
into the system necessitate the granting of a right to absolute 
silence - which right, if exercised, would thwart the grand 
8. 
jury's function. The other bothersome element of station-
house interrogation, the opportunity for undiscoverable actual 
coercion, does not exist in the grand jury setting.* 
(My rejection of the equation between custodial police 
interrogations and grand jury interrogation (even of the 
"putative defendant") means only that it is unnecessary to 
grant~ than the constitutional privilege against self 
incrimination in order to protect the exercise of that privilege. 
It says nothing about a wholly different question: whether 
the inherent coerciveness of the grand jury setting, admittedly 
sanctioned historically and necessary to the investigative 
process,nevertheless requires that the witness be advised of 
his privilege against self-incrimination. This is a much 
tougher question than whether Miranda warnings are necessary. 
I only want to flag it now, and will discuss it later in 
the memorandum). 
The second argument for requiring that Miranda warnings 
be given to the "putative defendant" is based, as noted 
earlier, not on alleged coerciveness of grand jury questioning, 
but on distaste for the use of the grand jury. The argument 
is that without a requirement of Miranda warnings the 
-,\-on this point it must be emphasized that "actual coercion" 
refers to the type of coercion that overbears one's will so as 
to make any incriminating statemen~ involuntary. A finding of 
such coercion has always required evidence of outrageous tactics 
like beating or trickery or isolation. None of this could occur 
in the grand jury room. The kinds of coercion that might occur -
the steady gaze of the prosecutor, the tension and fatigue from 
answering question upon question - are only elements of the 
inherent and historically sanctionelcoercion of the process, and 
do not rise to the level of actual coercion that has been found 
in the past to violate due process. 
1 
9. 
authorities can h4~l a person before the grand jury whom 
they have probable cause to arrest, not tell him their 
suspicions, and question him in hopes that he will give even 
more incriminating evidence. This procedure amounts to an 
end run on Miranda, for if the police were to take the person 
into custody for questioning they would have to give the 
warnings. 
In general, I happen to favor this procedure. If one 
assumes, as I do, that grand jury questioning is less conducive 
to abuse by the authorities and inherently less coercive than 
custodial interrogation, then there is no need for Miranda 
warnings if the police choose to go to the grand jury instead 
of questioning the suspect themselves. There is only one 
respect in which the practice of taking unsuspecting potential 
defendants before the grand jury does bother me. Such a 
person, unaware of the police suspicions, may answer questions 
that he would refuse to answer if he knew that he was a prime 
suspect.* To avoid this (which smacks a bit of t rickery to 
me), it is worth considering a requirement that the prosecut~r 
inform a person of his status.** Aside from that one troubling 
*For instance, a person who did not know he was a suspect might 
see nothing dangerous about answering a question concerning his 
associations with X. If he knew he was himself a suspect, how-
ever, he might add 2 plus 2 and realize that his answers could 
incriminate. 
**Of course, such a requirement would raise the problem of pin-
pointing the moment when a person becomes such a prime suspect, 
the same problem that is raised by CAS's requirement that a 
"putative defendant" receive Miranda warnings. This is a 
strong counterargument against requiring that a prime suspect 
be advised of that fact. 
10. 
point, however, I see nothing wrong with taking putative 
defendants before the grand jury. They are still protected 
by the Fifth Amendment privilege like anyone else. (Moreover, 
I see no constitutional barrier to taking even an indicted 
defendant before the grand jury. He, too, would have the privilege 
as his protection. Forcing him to appear before the grand jury 
does not involve the danger of forcing him to take the stand 
at trial, for in the case of the grand jury the inevitable 
inference of guilt that arises when someone invokes the Fifth 
Amendment would not be drawn by the ultimate fact-finders. 
If even an actual defendant could be taken before the grand 
jury, certainly a putative one can be.) 
III. Should a Grand Jury Witness Be Advised 
of his Fifth Amendment Privilege? 
l 
You should seriously consider requiring that every grand 
jury witness be advised of his F~fth Amendment privilege, 
simply as a prophylactic measure to insure that he knows of 
it. Such a requirement would not hinder the grand jury inquiry 
in any way. And even though "taking the Fifth" is a household 
phrase, some people still do not know of the privilege and 
others who do know of it think that it cannot be asserted before 
a grand jury. No societal interest is served when a person 
fails to utilize a constitutional privilege out of ignorance. 
Furthermore, such an advisement of the privilege would help 
offset the inherent coerciveness of the grand jury setting, 
which, although necessary and historically intended, no doubt 
11. 
does intimidate some people into forgetting that they can refuse 
to answer some questions. 
Two points should be made about this suggestion. First, 
it would apply across the board to all grand jury witnesses 
rather than just to putative defendants. In terms of inherent 
coerciveness, there is no difference between the putative 
defendant and another witness. Second, advising a witness of 
his privilege is a wholly different matter from giving him 
Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings give him more than the I 
constitution; advising him of the constitutional right itself 
obviously does not.* 
It is my understanding that most prosecutors already 
advise witnesses of their privilege. Given that fact, and 
the fact that Mandujano was advised of it in this case, it 
would be possible oJ~o.S~ ~ insure adherence to this salutary 
practice in the future without the necessity of laying down 
a prophylactic rule. If the opinion were written to emphasize 
*The government argues that it is unnecessary to advise a 
witness of the privilege because (1) the privilege is 
freedom from "compelled" self-incrimination only, and (2) 
the grand jury does not "compel." I disagree with them on 
the second point. My understanding is that a person is 
"compelled" if he must answer, and a grand jury witness must 
answer or face contempt. I believe the government is trying 
to equate the word "compelled" in the Constitution's state-
ment of the privilege, to the concept of "coercion" in the 
cases that suppress confessions on due process grounds. 
12. 
that Mandujano was advised fully (as I believe he was), 
prosecutors would get the message. This technique would be 
preferable to laying down a prophylactic rule, for the latter 
would give new grounds for suppression of probative evidence.* 
IV. Who Is a Putative Defendant? 
If the case is decided on one of the two grounds above 
(no need for Miranda warnings, or no need for suppression of 
perjurious testimony in any event), the question of identifying 
the putative defendant will not be reached. If it is reached, 
however, I would urge adoption of a purely objective standard 
such as CAS's, rather than the objective/subjective one pressed 
by the government. Only the former could be applied with any 
consistency. The latter standard, moreover, would allow the 
prosecutor to do exactly what he claims to have done here: 
decide to indict after the grand jury appearance on the s ame 
evidence that was available before, apparently out of pique 
"w ,-1-nc.ss 1 
at the witness' grand jury behavior.** Here, tnezgrand jury 
performance included perjury, so I would not be too concerned 
*Testimony given to the grand jury in the absence of advise-
ment of the privilege would still be probative because it would 
not have been coerced in violation of due process. Such 
coercion is what undercuts the probative value of statements. 
**The government's argument that at the time of his appearance 
Mandjuano was not a putative defendant because the prosecutor 
did not know that his known actions constituted a crime , is 
the strangest thing I've heard yet. I could just see that as 
a basis for a "nonputative defendant" holding in U.S. Reports! 
13. 
that the prosecutor retaliated. But in another case he might 
decide to prosecute because he got mad at the witness' 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury -
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1Jnited State i P~titigner1] On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
v. United ~tate1:.1 Court of Ap .. 
Roy M;andujano, peals for the :Fifth Circuit, 
[January -, 1976] 
lVIfl. CHIElF JusTic:m BURGER delivereq th~ opiniqn gf 
the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the warnin~ 
called for by Miranda v. United States, 384 U. S. 436 
(1966), must be given to a grand jury witness who is 
called to testify about criminal activities in which he 
ma.y have been personally involved; and whether, absent 
such warnings, false statements made to the grand jury 
must be suppressed in a prosecution for perjury based 
on those statements. 
(1) 
During the course of a grand Jury investigation into 
narcotics traffic in San Antonio, Tex., federal prosecu .. 
tors assigned to the Drug Enforcement Administration 
Task Force learned of an undercover narcotics officerls 
encounter with respondent in March 1973. At that 
time, the agent had received information that respond-
ent, who was employed as a bartender at a local tavern, 
was dealing in narcotics. The agent, accompanied by 
an informant, met respondent at the tavern and talked 
for several hours. During the meeting, respondent 
agreed to obtain heroin for the agent, and to that end 
placed several phone calls from the bar. He also re-
quested and received $650 from the agent to make the 
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so advanced to secure the heroin. However, an hour 
later rnspondent returned to the bar without narcotics 
and ret\}rned the agent's money. Respondent instructed 
the agent to telephone him at the bar that evening to 
make arrangements for the transaction. . The agent tried 
but was unable to contact respondent as directed. The 
record provides no explanation for respondent's failure 
to keep his appointment. No further action was taken. 
by the agent, and the investigatory file on the matter 
was closed. The agent did, however, report the infor-
mation to federal prosecutors. At that time, the Gov-
ernment was seeking information on local drug traffic 
to present to a special grand jury investigating illicit 
traffic in the area. 
Respondent was subpoenaed to testify before the grand 
jury on May 2, 1973; this was approximately six weeks 
after the abortive narcotics transaction at the tavern 
where respondent was employed. When called into the 
grand jury room and after preliminary statements, the 
following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and 
respondent : 
"Q. Now, you are required to answer all the ques-
tions that I ask you except for the ones that you 
feel would tend to incriminate you. Do you 
understand? 
11A. Do I answer all the questions you ask? 
"Q. You have to answer all the questions except 
for those you think will incriminate you in the 
commission of a crime. Is that clear? 
(!A. Yes, siro 
"Q. You don't have to answer questions which 
would incriminate you. All other questions you 
have to answer openly and truthfully. And, of 
course, if you do not answer those [questions] truth-
fully, in other words if you lie about certain ques-
~: 
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tions, you could possibly be charged with perjury. 
Do you understand that? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Have you contacted a lawyer in this matter? 
"A. I don't have one. I don't have the money 
to get one. 
"Q. Well, if you would like to have a lawyer, he 
cannot be inside this room. He can only be outside. 
You would be free to consult with him if you so 
chose. Now if during the course of this investiga-
tion, the questions that we ask you, if you feel you 
would like to have a lawyer outside to talk to let 
me know." 
During the questioning respondent admitted that he 
had previously been convicted of distributing drugs, that 
he had recently used heroin himself, and that he had 
purchased heroin as recently as five months previously. 
Despite this admitted experience with San Antonio's 
heroin traffic, respondent denied knowledge of the identity 
of any dealers, save for a streetcorner source named Juan. 
Respondent steadfastly denied either selling or attempt-
ing to sell heroin since the time of his conviction 15 years 
before. 
Respondent specifically disclaimed having discussed the 
sale of heroin with anyone during the preceding year and 
stated that he would not even try to purchase an ounce 
of heroin for $650. Respondent refused to amplify on 
his testimony when directly confronted by the prose-
cutor : 
"Q. Mr. Mandujano, our information is that you 
can tell us more about the heroin business here in 
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thing you would like to add telling us more about 
who sells heroin? 
uA. W'ell, sir, I couldn't help you because, you 
know, I don't get along with the guys and I just 
can't tell you, you know.'' 
Following this appearance, respondent was charged by 
a grand jury on June 13, 1973, in a two-count indict-
ment with attempting to distribute heroin in violation of 
21 U. S. C. §§ 841 (a)(l), 846, and for willfully and 
knowingly making a false material declaration to the 
grand jury in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1623.1 The 
falsity of his statements was conceded; his sole claim was 
that the testimony before the grand jury should be sup-
pressed because the Government failed to provide the 
warnings called for by Miranda. Following an eviden-
tiary hearing, the District Court granted respondent's 
motion to suppress. The court held that respondent was a 
"putative" or "virtual" defendant when called before the 
grand jury; respondent had therefore been entitled to full 
Miranda warnings. 365 F. Supp. 155 (WD Tex. 1973).2 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 496 F. 2d 1050 (CA5 
1974) . It recognized that certain warnings had in fact 
1 Count 2 of the indictment charged that the following decla,ra-
tions were materially false : 
"Q. Have you talked to anyone about selling heroin to them 
during the la.st year? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. And you have never told anyone that you would try to get 
heroin to sell to them? 
"A. No, sir, 
"Q. No one has ever given you any money .. .. 
"A. No. 
"Q .... to go buy them heroin? 
"A No, sir." 
2 Respondent was subsequently tried and convicted under Count I 
of the indictment for attempting to distribute heroin. The grand 
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been given to respondent at the outset of his grand jury 
appearance. But the court agreed with the District 
Court that "full Miranda warnings should have been 
accorded Mandujano who was in the position of a virtual 
or putative defendant." Id., at 1052. The essence of 
the Court of Appeals' holding is: 
" In order to deter the prosecuting officers from bring-
ing a putative or virtual defendant before the grand 
jury, for the purpose of obtaining incriminating or 
perjurious testimony, the accused must be ade-
quately apprised of his rights, or all of his testimony, 
incriminating and perjurious, will be suppressed." 
Id., at 1056. (Emphasis added.) 
In so ruling, the court undertook to distinguish its 
own holding in United States v. Orta, 253 F. 2d 312 
(CA5 1958) , in which Judge Rives, speaking for the 
court, stated that a grand jury witness 
u . • • might answer truthfully and thereafter 
assert the constitutional guaranty, Under no cir-
cumstances, however, could he commit perjury and 
successfully claim that the Constitution afforded 
him protection from prosecution for that crime. As 
said in Glickstein v. United States,' ... the immunity 
afforded by the constitutional guaranty relates to 
the past, and does not endow the person who testi-
fies with a license to commit perjury.'" Id., at 314. 
(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.) 
In the Orta opinion, Judge Rives went on to observe: 
"The only debatable question is one of the super-
vision of the conduct of Government representatives 
in the interest of fairness. In United States v. 
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later be indicted furnishes no basis for requmng 
that he be advised of his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, when summoned to give testimony 
before a Grand Jury.' 
"That holding is applicable to the present record. 
There is no showing that the Grand Jury before 
which Orta testified was seeking to indict him or 
any other person already identified." Ibid. (Cita-
tions omitted.) 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the "totality of 
the circumstances" commanded suppression of all the 
testimony on which the charge of perjury rested. 
We disagree and reverse. 
(2) 
The grand jury is an integral part of our constitutional 
heritage which was brought to this country with the 
common law. The Framers, most of them trained in 
the English tradition, accepted the grand jury as a basic 
guarantee of individual liberty; notwithstanding periodic 
criticism, the grand jury continues to function as a. 
barrier to reckless or unfounded charges. "Its adoption 
in our Constitution as the sole method for preferring 
charges in serious criminal cases shows the high place it 
held as an instrument of justice." Costello v. United 
States, 350 U. S. 359, 362 (1956). Its historic office has· 
been to provide a shield against arbitrary or oppressive· 
action, by insuring that serious criminal accusations will 
be brought only upon the considered judgment of a rep-
resentative body of citizens acting under oath and under· 
judicial instruction and guidance. 
Earlier we noted that the law vests the grand jury· 
with substantial powers, because "[t]he grand jury's in-
vestigative powers must be broad if its public responsi-
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Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 344 (1974); Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 700 (1972) . Indispensable to the 
exercise of its power is the authority to compel the at-
tendance and the testimony of witnesses, Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972), and to require 
the production of evidence. United States v. White, 322 
U. S. 694 (1944) . 
When called by the grand jury, witnesses are thus 
legally bound to give testimony. Calandra, supra, at 343. 
This principle has long been recognized. In United 
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cases No. 14,692e, at 3~ 
Chief Justice Marshall drew on English precedents, 
aptly described by Lord Chancellor Hardwick in the 18th 
Century, and long accepted in America as a hornbook 
proposition : "The public has a right to every man's evi-
dence." This Court has repeatedly invoked this funda-
mental proposition when dealing with the powers of the 
grand jury. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709 
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 688; Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S., at 443; United States v. Mania, 
317 U. S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
The grand jury's authority to compel testimony is not, 
of course, without limits. The same Amendment that 
establishes the grand jury also guarantees that "no per-
son ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself .... " The duty to give evidence 
to a grand jury is therefore conditional; every person 
owes society his testimony, unless some recognized privi-
lege is asserted. 
Under settled prmc1ples, the Fifth Amendment does 
not confer an absolute right to decline to re-
spond m a grand Jury inquiry; the privilege does not 
negate the duty to testify but simply conditions that 
duty . The privilege cannot, for example, be asserted by 
a witness to protect others from possible criminal prose-
cution Royer,'! v United States, 340 U. S. 367 (1951) ; 
T 
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United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931); Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906). Nor can it be invoked 
simply to protect the witness' interest in privacy. "Ordi-
narily, of course, a witness has no right of privacy before 
the grand jury." Calandra, supra, at 353. 
The very availability of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to grand jury witnesses, recognized by this Court in 
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892), sug-
gests that occasions will of ten arise when potentially 
incriminating questions will be asked in the ordinary 
course of the jury's investigation. Probing questions to 
all types of witnesses is the stuff that grand jury investi-
gations are made of; the grand jury's mission is, after all, 
to determine whether to make a presentment or return 
an indictment. "The basic purpose of the-English grand 
jury was to provide a fair method for instituting criminal 
proceedings against persons believed to have committed 
crimes." Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., at 362. 
It is in keeping with the grand jury's historic function 
as a shield against arbitrary accusations to call before it 
persons suspected of criminal activity, so that the investi-
gation can be complete. This is true whether the grand 
jury embarks upon an inquiry focused upon individuals 
suspected of wrongdoing, or is directed at persons sus-
pected of no misconduct but who may be able to provide 
links in a chain of evidence relating to criminal conduct 
of others, or is centered upon broader problems of cqn" 
cern to society. It is entirely appropriate-indeed im-
perative- to summon individuals who may be able to 
illuminate the shadowy precincts of corruption and crime. 
Since the subject matter of the inquiry is crime, and 
often organized, systematic crime- as is true with drug 
traffic-it is unrealistic to assume that all of the wit-
nesses capable of providing useful information will be 
,. 
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pristine pillars of the community untainted by 
criminality. 
The Court has never ignored this reality of law en-
forcement. Speaking for the Court in Kastigar v. United 
States, MR. JUSTICE POWELL said : 
" [M] any offenses are of such a character that the 
only persons capable of giving useful testimony are 
those implicated in the crime." 406 U. S., at 446 
(1972) . 
MR. JusTICE WHITE made a similar observation in the 
context of a state investigation : 
" [T]he very fact that a witness is called .. . is 
likely to be based upon knowledge, or at least a sus-
picion based on some information, that the witness 
is implicated in illegal activities ... . " Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 
U S. 52, 102 (1964) (concurring opinion) . 
Moreover, the Court has expressly recogniz9d that" [t]he 
obligation to appear is no different for a person who may 
himself be the subject of the grand jury inquiry." 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 10 n. 8 (1973) . 
There 1s nothmg new about the Court's recognition of 
this reality of grand Jury inquiries. In one of the earliest 
cases dealing with the Fifth Amendment privilege, the 
Court observed : " [I] t is only from the mouths of those 
having knowledge of the [unlawful conduct] that the 
facts can be ascertained.'' Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 
591, 610 (1896) . 
Accordingly, the witness, though possibly engaged in 
some criminal enterpnse, can be required to answer be-
fore a grand jury, so long as there is no compulsion to 
answer questions that are incriminating; the witness can, 
of course, stand on the privilege, assured that its pro-
tection "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks 
10 
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to guard." Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S., at 562. 
I 
The witness must invoke the privilege, however, as the 
"Constitution does not forbid the asking of criminative 
questions." United States v. Mania, 317 U. S., at 433 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) . 
"The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. 
It does not preclude a witness from testifying volun-
tarily in matters which may incriminate him. If, 
therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, 
he must claim it or he will not be considered to have 
been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amend-
ment." 317 U. S., at 427. 
Absent a claim of the privilege, the duty to give testi-
mony remams absolute. 
The stage is therefore set when the question is asked. 
If the witness interposes his privilege, the grand jury has 
two choices. If the desired testimony is of marginal 
value, the grand jury can pursue other avenues of 
inquiry ; if the testimony is thought sufficiently impor-
tant, the grand jury can seek a judicial determination 
as to the bona fl.des of the witness' Fifth Amendment 
claim, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S., at 11-12; Hoffman v. 
United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486-487 (1951), in which 
case the witness must satisfy the presiding judge that 
the claim of privilege is not a subterfuge. If in fact 
" there 1s reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the 
witness from his being compelled to answer," Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U. S., at 599, the prosecutor must then 
determine whether the answer is of such overriding 
importance as to justify a grant of immunity to the 
witness. 
If rmmumty is sought by the prosecutor and granted 
by the presiding judge, the witness can then be com-
pelled to answer, on pain of contempt, even though the 
·. 
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testimony would implicate the witness in criminal 
activity. The reason for this is not hard to divine; 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated as much in opining 
that immunity is the quid pro quo for securing an 
answer from the witness: "Immunity displaces the 
danger." Ullman v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 439 
(1956); see also Piemonte v. United States, 367 U. S. 
556, 560 (1961). Based on this recognition, federal 
statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal 
judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations, 
are so familiar that they have become part of 
our "constitutional fabric." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 
U. S. 70, 81-82 (1974); Ullman v. United States, 350 
U. S., at 438. Immunity is the Government's ultimate 
tool for securing testimony that otherwise would be pro-
tected; unless immunity is conferred, however, testi-
mony may be suppressed, along with its fruits, if it 
is compelled over an appropriate claim of privilege. 
United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 255 (1966). On 
the other hand, when granted immunity, a witness once 
again owes the obligation imposed upon all citizens-the 
duty to give testimony-since immunity substitutes for 
the privilege. 
In this constitutional system for securing a witness' 
testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Per-
jured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the 
basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective re-
straints against this type of egregious offense are 
therefore imperative. The power of subpoena, broad 
as it is, and the power of contempt for refusing 
to answer, drastic as that is-and even the solem~ 
mty of the oath-cannot insure truthful answers. 
Hence, Congress has made the giving of false answers 
a criminal act punishable by severe penalties; in no other 
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way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open where 
the law can deal with it.8 
Similarly, our cases have consistently-indeed without 
exception-allowed sanctions for false statements or per., 
jury; they have done so even in instances where the 
perjurer complained that the Government exceeded its 
constitutional powers in making the inquiry. See, e. g., 
United States v. Knox, 396 U. S. 77 (1969); Bryson v. 
United States, 396 U. S. 64 (1969,); Dennis v. United 
States, 384 U. S. 855 (1966); Kay v. United States, 303 
U. S. 1 (1938); United States v. 'Kapp, 302 U. S. 214 
(1937), 
In Bryson, a union officer was required by federal labor 
law to file an affidavit averring that he was not a Com-
munist. The affidavit Bryson filed was materially false. 
In a collateral attack on his conviction, Bryson argued 
that since the statute ~equired him either to incriminate 
himself or lie, he could not lawfully be imprisoned for 
failure to comply. This Court rejected the contention: 
ic [I] t cannot be thought that as a general principle 
of our law a citizen has a privilege to answer fraudu-
lently a question that the Government should not 
have asked. Our legal system provides methods for 
challenging the Government's right to ask ques-
tions-lying is not one of them." 396 U. S., at 72. 
(Citation omitted.) 
Even where a statutory scheme granted blanket im-
munity from further use of testimony, the Court has 
8 Congress' view was expressed in the legislative history of the-
general perjury statute, 18 U. S. C. § 1621 : 
"A subpoena can compel the attendance of a witness before a 
grand jury or at trial. . . . But only the possibility of some sanction 
such as a perjury prosecution can provide any guarantee that his-
t,estimony will be truthful." S. Rep. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st 
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found perjured statements to fall outside the grant. In 
Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911), a 
bankrupt was indicted for perjury committed in the 
course of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy 
Act expressly conferred broad immunity on a bankrupt: 
u, • , no testimony given by him shall be offered in evi-
dence against him in any criminal proceeding." Id., at 
140-141. The Court rejected Glickstein's literalistic 
interpretation of the statute as conferring immunity from 
prosecution for perjury : 
u[T]he sanction of an oath and the imposition of 
a punishment for false swearing are inherently a 
part of the power to compel the giving of testimony, 
they are included in that grant of authority and 
are not prohibited by the immunity as to self-
incrimination. 
u[I]t cannot be conceived that there is power to 
compel the giving of testimony where no right exists 
to require that the testimony shall be given under 
such circumstances and safeguards as to compel it 
to be tru thfuL 
11 [T]he immunity afforded by the constitutional 
guarantee relates to the past and does not endow 
the person who testifies with a license to commit 
perjury." Id., at 141-142, 
(3) 
In this case, the Court of Appeals required the sup-
pression of perjured testimony given by respondent, as 
a witness under oath, lawfully summoned before an in-
vestigative grand jury and questioned about matters 
directly related to the grand jury's inquiry. The court 
reached this result because the prosecutor failed to give 
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Miranda warnings at the outset of Mandujano's interro-
gation. Those warnings were required, in the Court of 
Appeals' view, because Mandujano was a "virtual" or 
"putative" defendant-that is, the prosecutor had spe-
cific information concerning Mandujano's participation 
in an attempted sale of heroin and the focus of the grand 
jury interrogation, as evidenced by the prosecutor's ques-
tions, centered on Mandujano's involvement in narcotics 
traffic. The fundamental error of the prosecutor, in the 
court's view, was to treat respondent in such a way as 
to "smack of entrapment"; as a consequence, the court 
concluded that "elemental fairness" required the per-
jured testimony to be suppressed. 496 F. 2d, at 1058. 
The court's analysis, premised upon the prosecutor's 
failure to give Miranda warnings, erroneously applied 
the standards fashioned by this Court in Miranda. Those 
warnings 4 were aimed at the evils seen by the Court as 
endemic to police interrogation of a person in custody. 5 
Mfranda addressed extra-judicial confessions or admis-
sions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment which 
lacked witll.Qw~ procedural safeguards. The decision ex-
pressly rested on the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination; the prescribed warnings sought to negate 
the "compulsion" thought to be inherent in police sta-
tion interrogation. But the Miranda Court simply did 
4 "At the outset, if a person [in police custody] is to be subjected 
Lo interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal 
-terms that he has the right to remain silent . . . . The warning 
of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explana-
tion that anythmg sajd can and will be used against the individual 
in court . . . . An individual held for interrogation must be clearly 
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to 
have the lawyer with him during interrogation. . . . [I]t is neces-
sary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with 
an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be ap-
pointed to represent him." 384 U. S., at 46,7-473. 
5 3R4 U. S , at 444, n. 4. 
... ; 
. ' ,. 
' ' ., 
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not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial interrogation 
as equivalents: " . . . the compulsion to speak in the iso-
lated setting of the police station may well be greater 
than in courts or other official investigations, where there 
are often impartial observers to guard against intimida-
tion or trickery.'' Miranda, supra, at 461. 
The Court thus recognized that many official investiga-
tions, such as grand jury questioning, take place in a set-
ting wholly different from custodial police interrogation. 
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Miranda reveals 
a focus on what was seen by the Court as 
police "coercion" derived from "factual studies [relat-
mg to] police violence and the 'third degree' ... physi-
cal brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sus-
tained and protracted questioning incommunicado in 
order to extort confessions . . .. " Miranda, supra, at 445-
446. To extend these concepts to questioning before 
a grand jury inquiring into criminal activity under the 
guidance of a ,iudge is an extravagant expansion never 
remotely contemplated by this Court in Miranda. The 
dynamics of constitutional interpretation do not compel 
constant enlargement of every doctrine announced by the 
Court. 
The marked contrasts between a grand jury investiga-
tion and custodial interrogation have been commented on 
by the Court from time to time. Mr. Justice Marshall 
observed that the broad coercive powers of a grand jury 
are justified, because " ... in contrast to the police-it 
1s not likely that [ the grand jury] will abuse those 
powers." United States v. Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 45-46 
(1973) ( dissenting opinion). See also In re Graban, 35Z 
L1 . S .. at 347. 
(4) 
The warnings volunteered by the prosecutor to re-
spondent in this case were more than sufficient to infor:rn 
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him of his rights-and his responsibilities-and particu-
larly of the consequences of perjury. To expand the 
concepts of Miranda, as contemplated by the Court of 
Appeals, would require that the witness be told that 
there was an absolute right to silence; obviously any 
such warning would be incorrect, for there is no such 
right before a grand jury. Under Miranda, a person in 
police custody has, of course, an absolute right to de-
cline to answer any question, incriminating or 
innocuous, see Michigan v. Mosley, - U.S. - (1975), 
whereas a grand jury witness, on the contrary, has an 
absolute duty to answer all questions, subject only to 
a valid Fifth Amendment claim. And even when the 
grand jury witness asserts the privilege, questioning need 
not cease, except as to the particular subject to which 
the privilege has been addressed; compare Michigan v. 
Mosley, supra, at -; other lines of inquiry may prop-
erly be pursued. 
Respondent was also informed that if he desired 
he could have the assistance of counsel, but that 
counsel could not be inside the grand jury room. That 
statement was plainly a correct recital of the law. 
No criminal proceedings had been instituted against re-
spondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
had not come into play. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 
(1972). A witness "before a grand jury cannot insist, as 
a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by 
counsel. .. . " ln re Graban, 352 U. S., at 333.6 In addi-
tion, under settled principles the witness may not insist 
upon the presence of his attorney in the grand jury room. 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6 (d) . 
Respondent, by way of further explanation, was also 
6 The right to counsel mandated by Miranda was fashioned to 
secure the suspecfs Fifth Amendment privilege in a setting thought 
inherently coercive, The Sixth Amendment was not implicated, 
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warned that he could be prosecuted for perjury if he 
testified falsely. Since respondent was already under 
oath to testify truthfully, this explanation was redun-
dant; it served simply to emphasize the obligation al-
ready imposed by the oath. 
"Once a witness swears to give truthful answers, 
there is no requirement to 'warn him not to commit 
perjury, or conversely to direct him to tell the truth.' 
It would render the sanctity of the oath quite mean-
ingless to requite admonition to adhere to it." 
United States v. Winter, 348 F. 2d 204, 210 (CA2 
1965). (Emphasis added.) 
See also United States v. Nickels, 502 F. 2d 1173, 1176 
(CA7 1974) . 
Similarly, a witness subpoenaed to testify before a 
petit jury and placed under oath has never been entitled 
to a warning that, if he violates the solemn oath to "tell 
the truth," he may be subject to a prosecution for per-
jury, for the oath itself is the warning. Nor has any 
case been cited to us holding that the absence of such 
warnings before a petit jury provides a shield against use 
of false testimony in a subsequent prosecution for perjury 
or in contempt proceedings.7 
In any event, a witness sworn to tell the truth before 
a duly constituted grand jury will not be heard to call 
for suppression of false statements made to that jury, 
any more than would be the case with false testimony 
7 The fact that warnings were provided in this case to advise re-
spondent of his Fifth Amendment pnvilege makes it unnecessary to 
consider whether any warning is required, as the Government asks 
us to determine. In addition to the warning implicit in the oath,. 
federal prosecutors apparently make it a practice to inform a wit-
ness of the privilege before questioning begins. This salutary prao-
t.ice for_ecloses challenges sui.:h. at$ respondent make.s hei:e,, 
18 
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before a petit jury or other duly constituted tribunal.8 
In another context, this Court has refused to permit a 
witness to protect perjured testimony by proving a 
Miranda violation. In Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 
222 ( 1970), the Court held that notwithstanding a 
Miranda violation: 
"[T]he Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be 
construed to include the right to commit perjury." 
Id., at 225. 
More recently, the Court reaffirmed this salutary 
principle: 
"[T]he shield provided by Miranda is not to be 
perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or 
even perjuriously, free from the risk of confronta-
tion with prior inconsistent utterances." Oregon v. 
Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 723 (1975). 
See also Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954); 
United States v. DiGiovanni, 397 F. 2d 409, 412 
1(CA7 1968); Cargill v. United States, 381 F. 2d 849 
8 Masinia v. United States, 296 F. 2d 871, 877 (CA8 1961) . 
Cases voiding convictions for perjury involved situations where the 
investigatory body was acting outside its lawful authority. Brown 
v. United States, 234 F. 2d 549 (CA8 19.57) ; United States v. 
Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929 (Colo. 1963) ; United States v. Cross, 
170 F. Supp. 303 (DC 1959); United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 
383 (DC 1956) . For example, in Brown v. United States, the 
Court of Appeals concluded that a federal grand jury in Nebraska 
had undertaken a "roving commission," investigating matters out-
side its lawful power. The District Court in that case had con-
cluded that the grand jury's activities had come "perilously close 
to being a fraud on the jurisdiction of this Court." Quoted at 245 
F. 2d, at 553. No such circumstances are presented by this case. 
We therefore have no occasion to address the correctness of the: 
results reached by the courts m these inapposite instances. 
.. 
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(CAlO 1967); United States v. DiMichele, 375 F. 2d 959, 
960 (CA3 1967). 
The fact that here the grand jury interrogation had 
focused on some of respondent's specific activities does 
not require that these important principles be jettisoned; 
nothing remotely akin to "entrapment" or abuse of 
process is suggested by what occurred here. Cf. Brown 
v. United States, 245 F. 2d 549 (CA8 1957). Assuming, 
arguendo, that respondent was indeed a "putative de-
fendant," that fact would have no bearing on the validity 
of a conviction for testifying falsely. 
The grand jury was appropriately concerned about the 
sources of narcotics in the San Antonio area. The at-
tempted heroin sale by respondent provided ample rea-
son to believe that he had knowledge about local peroin 
suppliers. It was, therefore, entirely proper to question 
him with respect to his knowledge of narcotics traffick-
ing.0 Respondent was free at every stage to interpose 
his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but 
perjury was not a permissible option. As the Tenth 
Circuit has held, the law provides "other methods for 
challenging the government's right to ask questions." 
United States v. Pommerening, 500 F. 2d 92, 100 (CAIO 
1974). 
9 This is not to suggest that the questioning would have been 
improper if the principal aim of the grand jury's investigation had 
centered upon respondent's activities, rather than a general investi-
gation into local na,rcotics traffic. As previously indicated, no 
impropriety results from summoning the target of · its inquiry; 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S., at 10 n. 8; it is appropriate, 
in fact, to give that individual :i,n opportunity to explain potentially 
damaging information before the . grand jury decides whether to 
return an indictment. As previously noted, see n. 2, supra, respond-
ent's grand jury testimony was not allowed in evidence to establish-
the &uhttantive charge, 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed. 
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JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN . JR. January 21, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 74-754 United States v. Mandjuano 
I shall be writing a separate opinion in due 
course. I think the circulated opinion addresses 
constitutional questions not necessary for decision 
in the case. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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January 21, 1976 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 74-754 United States v. Mandjuano 
I shall be writing a separate opinion in due 
course. I think the circulated opinion addresses 
constitutional questions not necessary for decision 
in the case. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
.itt:vrttttt (qourt of t!rt ~ttitth ;%tattg 
Jht64inghtn. ~. QJ. 2llffeJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R WHITE 
January 28, 1976 
Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ . 
The Chief Justice 
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Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
The Chief Justice 
CC: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
:Ii ,, --~ 
'i 
CHAMBERS OF 
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February 4, 1976 
Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sin50erely ,, / 
The Chief Justice 
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February 4, 1976 
Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sinf:erely ,; / 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
~U:Vrtmt cqo-ud of t~t ~h .$5faf:tg 
117as}ringfon, 1[l. cq. 20ffe.ll-~ 
April 1, 1976'=-
Re: No. 74-754 -- United States v. Roy Mandujano 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
T. M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
April 6, 1976 
Dear Chief: 
I have no problem with Mandujano. I have joined your 
opinion, and am with you all the way. 
You may be thinking of Estelle, in which I have now 
had an opportunity to put my ideas in the enclosed-concurrence -
which I will circulate tomorrow. 
As you will see, I concur in your opinion for the Court, 
and write to identify what seems to me to be the two separate 
lines of analysis followed by you and Bill Brennan, resulting -
to some extent - in no real joinder of issue between the two 
of you. Bill views Estelle as presenting a Zerbst situation, 
and I view it primarily as a failure of counse12to object at 
a time when the problem could have been cured. 
I view my little o:ri>ncurrence as supportive of your 
opinion. , 
Changing the subject, I do wish you well at the "Pound 
Conference". Having looked at some of the papers prepared 
for the Conference, and the list of some of the participants, 
it is certain to be an event of importance to our profession 
and the country. I certainly commend you on the concept, ' 
planning and your own personal leadership. 
Sincerely, 
-
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
,;, .. 









JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~t~ <qa-u:rl Jt tirt ~ttiltb' ~falTg 
'Jlti1Ulp:ttgfott. ~. <q. 2.llffe)}, 
April 12, 1976 
Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Potter: 
J 
Will you please join me in your separate concurring 
opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
.§n.prtntt <!fourl of tlrt ~~ .jhd:ts 
~a:slfinghrn. ,. <!f. 2llffe'!, 
April 13, 1976 
/ 
Re: No. 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
Dear Potter: 
I have your concurring opinion in this case and I am not clear · 
as to precisely what troubles you. We granted cert because both the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals held Miranda warnings essen-
tial as a predicate to convict a grand jury witness for perjury. Thus 
it seems to me that the Miranda is sue is properly reached in this case. 
Both the proposed opinion and Bill Brennan's concurring opinion 
recognize that attacks upon perjury convictions may be appropriate 
or, at the very least, that such attacks have succeeded in the past. 
My opinion, for example, notes: 11 [N]othing remotely akin to 
'entrapment' or abuse of process is suggested by what occurred 
here." Bill's opinion makes an analogous point: 
"Further, the record satisfies me that the respondent's 
false answers were not induced by governmental tactics 
or procecures so inherently unfair under all the cir·cum-
stances as to constitute ••. a violation of the Due 
Process Clause .... " 
These views have found expression in both the district courts and 
the courts of appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Thayer, 214 F.Supp. 
929 (D.Colo. 1963). See also United States v. Wong, No. 74-635, which 
is being held for Mandujano. Other courts faced with perjury convictions 
have embarked upon searching jurisdictional inquiries to determine 
whether the questions propounded to the witness exceeded the investiga-
tory body's authority. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 245 F.2d 
549 (CA 8 1957); Masinia v. United States, 296 F.2d 871 (CA 8 1961). 
Consequently, there is a body of law to the effect that a perjury 
conviction can be overturned under certain circumstances, albeit very 




Mandujano, it would remain open for a defendant to attack a perjury 
charge on the ground that an overbearing prosecutor coerced him to 
answer even after a valid claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
If a witness validly interposes the privilege, then the Government is 
powerless to order the person to answer without a grant of immunity. 
If the prosecutor thus were to exceed his power and extract an answer 
potentially inculpatory (after assertion of the privilege and without 
providing immunity), would we automatically assume that the witness 
had no defense whatever to a perjury charge? That would give me 
pause. 
If perjury may at times be "condoned," as it in fact has in the 
cases cited at p. 18, the issue before us then becomes whether, under 
the particular circumstances of this case, the offense of perjury may 
be excused because the Miranda warning was not given. The Fifth 
Circuit was of the view that failure to give Miranda warnings provided 
a sufficient reason to excuse perjury. We all seem to agree that the 
Miranda warning need not be given. The fulcrum at both courts was 
consideration of the Miranda is sue. 
I am therefore at a loss as to how we can justify treating the "gut" ,... 
issue presented to us. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






.§1tprm:t ~llurt of tfrt 'Jllnittb .:§mu11 
';lmm,,Jringh.m. ~. ~- 2Up'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 15, 1976 
Re: NO. 74-754, UNITED STATES v. MANDUJANO 
Dear Chief, 
This is in response to your letter of April 13. It is 
my understanding that the precise issue presented in this case 
and the cases that are being held from the CA 9 and CA 7 is 
whether the failure to give Miranda warnings requires the sup-
pression of grand jury testimony in connection with a prosecution 
for perjury based on that testimony. I agree with you and Bill 
Brennan that on the record in this case there is no basis for con-
cluding that the perjury prosecution must be barred because of 
outrageous prosecutorial conduct amounting to a denial of due 
process. 
That being so, the issue becomes whether the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination re-
quires suppression of Mandujano's false testimony. I believe that 
our prior cases make clear that, even assuming that Miranda 
warnings, or some kind of warnings, are required to safeguard 
the witness's Fifth Amendment rights, the failure to provide 
warnings does not preclude use of false testimony in a perjury 
prosecution. Accordingly, I concluded that it is not necessary 
to consider in this case whether the failure to give Miranda warn-
ings or any warnings at all would warrant the suppression of 
truthful grand jury testimony of a "putative defendant" in connec-
tion with his prosecution for a substantive crime. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 







THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
May 12, 1976 
Re: 74-754 - U. S. v. Mandujano 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Potter's concurring opinion prompts me to add 





United States v. Mandujano 
No. 7(1.-754 
INSERT - P. 17 
INSERT - P. 17, fn. 7 (add at end of footnote) 
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart 
suggests that an unwarned grand jury witness who perjures 
himself has no claim by reason of the absence of warn-
ings. Under that rationale, a witness, under oath to 
tell the truth, but not specifically warned that he can 
refuse to answer a potentially inculpatory question, can 
properly be convicted of perjury. Whatever \ the merits of 
the Miranda doctrine as originally conceived, the policy 
consideration underlying that holding was the desire to 
secure the Fifth Amendment privilege in circumstances 
where, without warnings, a person in police custody might 
not have the ability to choose freely to remain silent. 
Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. __ , -- (1976). 
Such considerations, among others, led the Court of 
Appeals in the present case to conclude that a perjury 
conviction could not stand if the witness had not been 
affirmatively or specifically alerted to the need for 
exercising the privilege. By refraining to suggest that 
Miranda does not apply and at the same time indicating 
the 
that/absence of any warnings affords no defense in any 
perjury case, the concurring opinion would resolve an 
issue not before us and thus more appropriately left to 
another day: whether a 
the privilege, when put 
without any warning of 
-r-ce. 1110 ,-.)1 
either incrimi-
nating himself or lying, has any defense to a perjury 
charge. Here the colloquy between the prosecutor and 
the witness reveals conclusively that the latter was 
abundantly aware of his Fifth Amendment privilege, and 
there can be no doubt that respondent was fully capable 
of avoiding any such dilemma as postulated above. 
CHAMeERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~ttpuuu {!Jo-nrl of tqt~h ,jtaftg 
~as1tingtnn, ~- QJ. 21lffeJl., 
May 14, 1976 / 
Re: 74-754 - United States v. Mandujano 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Some reactions to my memorandum of May 12, proposing a 
possible expansion of note 7, page 17, persuade me that, 
given the 11 May-June syndrome, 11 it is better to leave the I 
situation substantially as it was prior to my memorandum 
of May 12. 
I will therefore plan on having the opinion ready for 
announcement next Wednesday in the form of the circulation 
dated April 6, except that the final sentence of note 7, page 17, 
will be omitted and the final sentence, note 9, page 19, will 
be omitted to avoid repetition. 
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